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A WAY TO OPERATIONALIZE THE DOD'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAM USING INFORMATION ASSURANCE POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGIES
"The world changed on September 11, 2001 . We learned that a threat that gathers on the other side of the earth can strike our own citizens. It's an important lesson; one we can never forget. Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this world. We're protected by daily vigilance at home. And we will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad."
-President George W. Bush
September 17, 2002
BACKGROUND
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to increase its dependence on commercial resources to assist in implementing military plans and executing its missions. In light of this situation, the DoD Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection (DCIP) strategy expects for military operations to become increasingly dependent on supporting infrastructure assets. With the dependence on these critical assets and the growth in outsourcing and privatization activities in the United States and overseas, the military will continue to make risk management decisions with respect to the level of investment needed to protect the critical infrastructure.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program was initially conceived at the national level and discussed in a report issued by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection as a risk management strategy. "It was for just this purpose that President Clinton called into being the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in July 1996.
In the fifteen months since its creation, the Commission -drawn from the federal government and the private sector -has thoroughly reviewed the vulnerabilities and threats facing our infrastructures." 1 This strategy was designed to provide processes, tools, and methodologies for making economic decisions about the types of protection or security that will be required to assure the continued availability of our critical assets. Even though DoD's CIP Program was established during the Clinton administration as a result of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), 2 the policies and funding were lacking for this program to be effective. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, senior government officials realized that the DoD DCIP should become part of the national emergency management planning and decision making process , and recommended the identification of funding specifically for the protection of the Defense Critical Infrastructure. (IA). 4 The testimony described a strategy entitled "Defense-in-Depth" and highlighted a GAO report entitled Information Security: Challenges to Improving DoD's Incident Response
Capabilities ), but did not describe the relevance of using this strategy in supporting the principles of DCIP. "Defense-in-Depth is mandated by DoD as the main IA implementation strategy to be used to protect national security systems and information. programs into the DCIP strategy and its Enterprise Architecture, the DoD will come closer to achieving its goal of Mission Assurance. This increased role for DISA will also impact its indirect support to the DCIP strategy, which will require closer coordination with the DPO-MA.
INTEGRATING DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH INTO DCIP
There are several existing DoD initiatives that have the potential of being utilized in the protection of DoD infrastructure and that could also be considered for broader national security applications. an elaborate reporting hierarchy that ties these organizations together. The organizations in the hierarchy are designed to report any type of activity that appears to be malicious in nature -for instance, activity that could cause a denial of service or system disruption to the GIG.
Even though the JTF-GNO and the DoD CERT monitor disruptions to the GIG for potential computer network attacks, the data collected is not used for analysis to determine any impacts that attacks may have on the Defense Critical Infrastructure. The CND community needs to adopt an approach like that currently used by the DPO-MA for managing risk in its efforts to identify and defend against attacks to the Defense Critical Infrastructure.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (NS/EP)
Even though NS/EP in this context is not the responsibility of geographic and functional Yet, greater international cooperation is needed for the management of critical telecommunications and cyber assets and the maintenance of services during times of crisis.
The DPO-MA should ensure that the NCC (as well as the MASC, as previously stated) is part of the Global NetOps C2 process, and that authority is provided to share information with organizations that control foreign communications resources. Knowing the reliability of both national and international telecommunications capabilities is a necessity for Combatant
Commanders, particularly when they must communicate with national assets during times of crisis, as well as when commercial networks support command centers in foreign countries.
ESTABLISH ASSESSMENT PROGRAM FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS
There are a number of assessment programs available for use in determining the DISA to serve as the overall systems integrator, ensuring CND systems work together and that DoD begins to design and build CND into its computer networks as they are developed, rather than adding it on after the fact. The development of diagnostic systems to support homeland security challenges is currently a high priority. "Because no part of our infrastructure can be fully protected from terrorist attacks, an essential element in a reasonably protected infrastructure is a diagnostic
system to determine what is damaged, the extent of the damage, and a means to divert usage to other parts of the infrastructure system." 26 These proposed diagnostic systems can also be used to monitor critical infrastructure components, whether they are used for defense or the civilian sector.
The goal should be a U.S. infrastructure that is over time increasingly better protected from terrorism while remaining compatible with a globally competitive American economy.
There are redundancies in the procedures outlined for protecting the DoD critical infrastructure and protecting the U.S. infrastructure from terrorist attack. There are planning issues with protecting both types of infrastructures. Challenges such as funding, technology, and metrics must be addressed. The Combatant Commander can continue to use the JSPS and the Chairman's Readiness System to assess combat readiness, but diagnostic systems such as the Global NetOps C2 must also be integrated into the process to provide a complete range of capabilities for a more effective DCIP plan.
DCIP STRATEGY
The Non-DoD infrastructure assets important to national security.
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The strategy of the DCIP's foundation is an effects-based, mission-focused framework that provides a comprehensive and integrated risk management process for understanding, assuring, and (when necessary) protecting essential defense infrastructures. This framework is being institutionalized in the DoD with the establishment of policies to integrate the framework into the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) as well as the DoD acquisition process.
STRATEGY AND GOALS
The DCIP Integrated Risk Management Strategy for fiscal years 2006-2011 consists of five major elements that are depicted in Table 1 . Each element addresses a function of management regarding risks to and the provision of mission assurance for the protection of DoD critical infrastructure. The goals and management initiatives do not address operationalization of the DCIP Program, nor do they suggest recommendations for the integration of IA and CND concepts or methods to provide the Combatant Commander current situational awareness in regard to the infrastructure supporting his or her mission. Certain unresolved policy issues represent risks to successful execution of the DCIP Integrated Risk Management Strategy (IRMS). These issues span topics such as metrics, information sharing, burden-sharing for fixing vulnerabilities, DoD-DHS coordination, approaches to program acceleration, and education and training.
The ASD(HD) will work inside DoD and with interagency partners to address unresolved policy and program issues in order to enable the successful implementation of the DCIP IRMS for fiscal years 2006-2011. 29 The final result of a continued lack of sustained investment in the DCIP will be the inability of military commanders and DoD policy-makers to effectively manage the impact of failing infrastructure assets. This inability can only degrade DoD's capability to mobilize and project its forces, and provide sustainment and civil assistance --essentially limiting or eliminating capabilities and factors crucial to the mission.
DEVELOP NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES
The strategy for implementing Homeland Defense requires advances in information and R&D efforts to achieve these goals will require substantial levels of funding. Many of the aforementioned organizations, however, may have ongoing research projects relating to the current war on terrorism. The DoD DCIP may be able to benefit from technological capabilities already developed for these projects. Additionally, a concerted effort to gain support and cooperation from both public and private sources should be launched-especially since much of the Defense Critical Infrastructure is also the nation's critical infrastructure (e.g. transportation, communication, and utility and energy systems).
An emerging operational concept called Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 32 (illustrated in Figure 2 ) may also be used by system architects supporting DCIP. But continued investment in communications and sensor technology throughout all components of each of the Services will be needed to fully achieve the objectives of NCW. An explanation of Net-Centric Warfighting is provided in Joint Pub 6.0: Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations. This doctrine highlights the information flow between sensors, command and control, and shooters, and recommends three components: an information grid, a sensor grid, and an engagement grid.
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The diagram in Figure 2 highlights this information flow and depicts the architecture described above. The DCIP Enterprise Architecture should build upon the concepts of the information flow described in Figure 2 and integrate these three components into the GIG. The DoD has already benefited from the information grid and command and control components with the development of the Global NetOps C2 process. The next step for the DPO-MA is to explore new opportunities to utilize the senor grid to assist in monitoring critical infrastructure assets to support the Combatant Commander. 14 "The Defense Information Systems Agency created the Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) program to provide enterprise services in support of the Global Information Grid. NCES will provide DoD organizations ubiquitous access to reliable, decision-quality information through a net-based services infrastructure and applications to bridge real-time and near-realtime communities of interest (COI). NCES will empower the edge user to pull information from any available source, with minimal latency, to support the mission. Its capabilities will allow GIG users to task, post, process, use, store, manage and protect information resources on demand for warriors, policy makers and support personnel." Department of Defense. DISA fact sheet describing NCES can be found at the following website <http://www.disa.mil/pao/fs/nces3.html>; Internet, accessed 15 January 2005.
15 "A major initiative in DoD's communications transformation is Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE), which will provide the robust network foundation to enable worldwide network-centric operations, supporting multiple transformation objectives. GIG-BE will create a ubiquitous "bandwidth-available" environment to improve national security intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control information-sharing. To implement GIG-BE, DISA is aggressively enhancing its current end-to-end information transport system, the Defense Information System Network (DISN), by significantly expanding bandwidth and physical diversity to selected locations worldwide. The program will provide increased bandwidth and diverse physical access to approximately 100 critical sites in the continental United States (CONUS) and in the Pacific and European theaters. These locations will be interconnected via an expanded GIG core. Specifically, GIG-BE will connect key intelligence, command, and operational locations with high bandwidth capability over physically diverse routes, and the vast majority of these locations will be connected by a state-of-the-art optical mesh network design." Department of Defense. DISA fact sheet describing GIG-BE can be found at the following website <http://www.disa.mil/main/prodsol/gig_be.html>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2005.
